I recently came across Nick Boström's article about the simulation argument, which goes that there is a non-zero chance that we are actually simulated individuals, and not actually made of carbon at all. It was spun out of The Matrix series of movies, though is a recurring theme right from Descartes and the Brain in a Vat.
Key to this idea is the argument of substrate independence, that is, carbon-based cells are not the only possible way of conjuring consciousness. Surely it isn't the carbon-based molecules per se that cause consciousness, but rather their configuration, and the kinds of computation (if that's the right word) being performed. Surely any "computer program" that reproduces the workings of the brain sufficiently well would suffice, since its operation and outputs would be essentially identical to the biological brain.
The simulation argument goes that we are not all that far from achieving that level of computation, so therefore there may well exist simulated minds in the near future. The problem is, how would you tell if you are real or not? The short answer is that you can't, as Descartes argued.
It occurs to me that there are two forms of simulation argument:
One of my pet theories is simulation independence, which I will explain.
Plato's world of ideals wasn't really talking about mathematics, but was talking about the higher level concepts such as horses. Nevertheless, the concept of existence beyond the human mind, and beyond the physical world, was introduced.
Although there is no Modeller, where does the Platonic world of mathematics come from?
I wrote a short story exploring the idea of simulation independence. Be warned: its quality is on a par with Nick Boströms poetry.
Key to this idea is the argument of substrate independence, that is, carbon-based cells are not the only possible way of conjuring consciousness. Surely it isn't the carbon-based molecules per se that cause consciousness, but rather their configuration, and the kinds of computation (if that's the right word) being performed. Surely any "computer program" that reproduces the workings of the brain sufficiently well would suffice, since its operation and outputs would be essentially identical to the biological brain.
The simulation argument goes that we are not all that far from achieving that level of computation, so therefore there may well exist simulated minds in the near future. The problem is, how would you tell if you are real or not? The short answer is that you can't, as Descartes argued.
It occurs to me that there are two forms of simulation argument:
- One where your brain is simulated, for purposes unknown. I'll call the first one brain simulation.
- One where your entire universe is simulated (again for unknown purposes), and the cells in your brain are created within that simulation. Maybe this universe was allowed to evolve from a Big Bang. I'll call this one physics simulation.
One of my pet theories is simulation independence, which I will explain.
- A simulation is a model obeying mathematical rules.
- The result of a simulation is a mathematical structure.
- Mathematical structures exist independently of physical existence, or whether they are created or perceived by man. This is the Platonic world of ideals.
- Therefore, simulations exist independently of observation, a phenomenon I call simulation independence.
- When people run a simulation, they are discovering something that's already there. They are observing something that has already happened, and would have happened irrespective of whether they had run the simulation.
- There is no theoretical limit to the size or complexity of simulations. Simulations exist in a Platonic world, that are bounded by the axioms of mathematics, not the physical limitations of computability in the universe you are in.
- When you switch off a simulation, the simulation (in the Platonic world) keeps on running.
- It makes no sense to ask whether you are part of a simulation, because the inhabitants of the simulation are in the Platonic world. You don't have to worry.
- Anything that can exist, does exist, provided it makes coherent sense from a mathematical model.
- There does not need to be a Modeller.
- Everything that will happen, in a sense has already happened in the Platonic world. Time is an illusion.
- Parallel universes exist (provided that they are mathematically valid).
- We are very likely living in a mathematical structure conjured by the Platonic world of ideals.
Plato's world of ideals wasn't really talking about mathematics, but was talking about the higher level concepts such as horses. Nevertheless, the concept of existence beyond the human mind, and beyond the physical world, was introduced.
Although there is no Modeller, where does the Platonic world of mathematics come from?
I wrote a short story exploring the idea of simulation independence. Be warned: its quality is on a par with Nick Boströms poetry.
Comments
Simulation of individuals is a done with a computer which is equivalent to Turing machine. However, an interesting question is: is the simulation computable? In a sense of Turing computability. It may be not, and an argument for this you can find in Roger Penrose's fascinating book: "The Emperor New Mind". Maybe processes in human brains are based on some quantum phenomena such as uncertainty principle etc. Such phenomena may be necessary to implement free will, intuition etc. Thus, current computation models may just not be powerful enough to simulate humans or any other conscious being.
Penrose assumes free will (always dangerous), then, since our minds are conjured from brains, an brains by physics, naturally wonders how physics could allow free will.
It is also a mistake to equate free will and non-determinism. Quantum theory is a source of non-determinism, but that does not mean that we have free will. How does the roll of a dice at a quantum level possibly improve the quality of our consciousness? Does a soul "choose" which wave functions to collapse, thereby controlling us like a puppet?
I see no need for such explanations. I don't believe in free will.
Interesting article - but I have an objection to your train of argument leading to the theory of simulation independence.
In point 4, I think you are doing a bit of a Hamlet. Hamlet famously and humoursly overvalued expressibility: "Words. Words. Words."
Although what would have been Kublah Khan (but for the untimely visitor) - or the last part Schubert's Unfinished Symphony - can be expressed mathematically (words, words, words or notes, notes, notes respectively), and so in some sense "exist", I think it is a big (and unproven) leap of faith to equate that abstract existence with the concrete existence of, say Ode to Joy.
Of course, in an abstract domain, such as mathematics, that abstract existence is all there is, so that equality does apply. But there are any number of real world examples of how actual existence or achievement is treated differently from the mere expression of those things.
"It’s easy to sit there and say you’d like to have more money. And I guess that’s what I like about it. It’s easy. Just sitting there, rocking back and forth, wanting that money. —Jack Handey"